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PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANTITRUST
LAWS WORKS OCCASIONALLY: BOARD
OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF OKLAHOMA v. NCAA, A CASE IN POINT
D. KENT MEYERS* & IRA HOROWITZ**
The Court considers the result achieved by plaintiffs as an historic one;
that by their prevailing in the lawsuit, plaintiffs have conferred a benefit
upon a significant industry and a large segment of the public.1
L Introduction
Sometimes private enforcement of the antitrust laws brings about results that benefit
significant elements of our society. While this is not the norm, it is a desirable result
and one contemplated by the drafters of the antitrust laws. This article will present
just such a situation.
Two private plaintiffs2 joined together to bring a suit against a "classic cartel" and
asked only for injunctive relief. No damages for injury to the plaintiffs' business or
* Shareholder and Director of Crowe & Dunlevy, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Adjunct Professor
of Law at University of Oklahoma College of Law (Antitrust Law). B.B.A., 1960, J.D., 1964, University
of Oklahoma; LL.M., 1976, with an emphasis on Antitrust and Commercial Law, Harvard Law School.
Crowe & Dunlevy represented the plaintiffs in the principal case commented on in this article.
** Ho Sin-Hang Visiting Professor of Decision Sciences and Managerial Economics at The Chinese
University of Hong Kong, and Graduate Research Professor of Decision and Information Sciences at the
University of Florida. B.A., 1955, Johns Hopkins University; Ph.D., 1959, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. Professor Horowitz testified as an expert witness in the principal case commented on in this
article.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the help of Ned Lane in completing this article.
1. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, No. CIV-81-1209-BU (V.D. Okla. Jan. 9,
1985) (order awarding attorneys fees).
2. The University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia.
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property were sought. The sole motivation was to sever the economic bondage that
ensnared these two plaintiffs and others similarly situated and to set them free to
compete in the market place without the impediments of unlawful restraints of trade.
In NCAA, the University of Oklahoma (Oklahoma) and the University of Georgia
(Georgia) complained that the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) was
restraining these two Universities' rights to market the television of their football
games. Oklahoma and Georgia complained that the actions of the NCAA in binding
them, involuntarily, to a television contract with a network(s) of the NCAA's choice
and forcing them to sell their television rights for a price fixed by others were wrong.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court all agreed. The
"classic cartel" was destroyed. Oklahoma and Georgia were set free to pursue their
own objectives. The market was opened for vigorous competition. "Suddenly, it was
goodbye NCAA, helfo freedom."3
This article will explore what has happened to the televising of college football
games since this deci!3ion and what impact it has had on the universities, the television
networks, the advertisers, and the viewing public.
During and shortly after the litigation, many predicted: (1) that live gate attendance
would go down; (2) that the termination of the NCAA system would result in
saturation of the television market with college football; (3) that the price of
advertising during college football game telecasts would correspondingly go down; (4)
that the amount paid per exposure to the competing universities would go down; and
(5) that money would be lost all around.
It was prophesied that the only person who would gain out of this decision would
be the fan.4 The fan was sometimes referred to as "Joe Six Pack"' or "Harry
Homeviewer in his La-Z-Boy."6 One got the impression that it was the height of
judicial heresy to tamper with the sacrosanct NCAA for the benefit of someone so
lowly as the fan. The discussion of the irony, called both delicious7 and sweet,' that
the action taken by Oklahoma and Georgia might result in their actually recovering
fewer dollars through their own actions in freedom than had been doled out by their
NCAA masters under cartel slavery illustrates the mindset of some contemporary
writers, that all that really mattered was the amount of economic return. Would these
same writers have thE same sympathy for OPEC?
Lost in this pro-cartel analysis is the idea that the NCAA was doing something
wrong under the antitrust laws and should be stopped. Moreover, the concept that the
antitrust laws were a consumer welfare prescription9 was ignored.
3. Frederick C. Klein, The TV Game: College Football Fumbles, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1984.
4. Rudy Martzke, T Football Fans Find Heaven, USA TODAY, Sept. 19, 1984, at 3C.
5. Mark Landler, The Too-Wide World of Television Sports, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 10, 1990,
6. William Taaffe, Too Much of a Good Thing, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 15, 1984, at 78.
7. William Taaffe, The Supreme Court's TV Ruling: Will the Viewer Benefit Most?, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, July 9, 1914, at 9.
8. Taaffe, supra note 6, at 79.
9. Reiter v. Sonoton- Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
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Precisely what Oklahoma and Georgia and Judge Burciaga predicted would happen
has happened. As a result of this decision, as will be shown in this article, many
universities that play major college football are better off. All competitors are free to
make their own economic decisions about their property. Advertisers that choose to
advertise during college football games are now paying a price determined by market
forces, rather than by noncompetitive backroom agreements. Networks are free to
compete for the televising of college football games without the impediment of
unlawful cartels and unreasonably exclusionary arrangements. Finally, the fan-
consumer is the beneficiary. The fan has a much broader selection of college football
to watch on over-the-air, cable, and pay-per-view television than was imagined back
in the early Eighties. As a result of this decision, the output is up and the price is
down. That is what competition is all about.
This did not come about as a result of any governmental intervention, class action,
or multidistrict litigation. This came about because two private plaintiffs had the
courage, tenacity, and ability to stop an unlawful system without seeking to personally
enrich themselves through treble damage recovery.
II. The Sherman Act - Legislative History
The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 in a sea of controversy concerning the
concept that "big is bad." The mood of the times was to try to control the growth of
big business. Whether the purpose of imposing control was for the benefit of the
consuming public or smaller competitors is not entirely clear. The latter, however,
seems to be the more likely justification than the former.'" While the Sherman Act"
bears the name of its original author, Senator John Sherman of Ohio, it did not have
his support when it was ultimately signed into law.'2 The Sherman Act, birthed in
controversy about its ultimate purpose, remains so embroiled today.
A. Public and Private Enforcement
The theory behind the enforcement scheme of the Sherman Act is that several
parties may be involved either simultaneously or in seriatim. Those several parties are:
(1) the United States Department of Justice; (2) the Federal Trade Commission; and
(3) private parties.
Moreover, the enforcement may either be civil or criminal. The governmental
authorities pursue the criminal prosecutions and, where appropriate, civil enforcement.
Private parties participate through civil enforcement only.
The Sherman Act has been called the "comprehensive charter of economic
liberty."'3 With this lofty motive, public enforcement seems logical. It may be fairly
asked why private enforcement would be either desirable or proper, when public
enforcement is a ready alternative? This article points out that, as a practical matter,
10. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
12. 1 JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKY, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION, § 2.02, at 2-36
n.123 (1991).
13. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
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private enforcement is occasionally the only vehicle available to protect an industry
or a large segment of the consuming public.
B. Department of Justice
The Department of Justice may enforce both the criminal and civil aspects of the
Sherman Act. 4 While the usual remedy sought by the Department of Justice is
injunctive relief, the government may also recover damages for harm it has sustained.
The government, however, may not seek damages for wrongs done to private parties.
The damages that the government may seek are limited to its actual damages rather
than treble damages.t" Furthermore, the criminal enforcement by the Department of
Justice can result in felony convictions for convicted defendants. Significant fines and
prison terms may be imposed.
C. Federal Trade Commission Enforcement
The Federal Trade Commission may enforce the antitrust laws from a civil context
only. It may enforce provisions of the Clayton Acte7 and is the principal agency in
charge of enforcing the Federal Trade Commission Act." One of its major missions
is to protect consumer welfare through injunctive relief.9 While it may enforce the
Sherman Act, it typically defers to the Department of Justice to carry out these
activities.
D. Private Parties
Private parties are entitled to enforce the antitrust laws through sections 4 and 16
of the Clayton Act.2" This civil private enforcement can result in treble damages,
injunctive relief, and one-way attorneys' fees."' The treble damage remedy has been
described as "designed to supply an ancillary force of private investigators to
supplement the Department of Justice in law enforcement."' Treble damages are
expected not only to redress grievances of a private party but also to "aid in achieving
the broad social object of the statute."' Punishment and deterrence are two of the
14. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVANKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw, POLICY AND PROCEDURE
73 (2d ed. 1989).
15. Id. at 74.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 75. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12-27 (West 1996), was enacted to combat price
discrimination, price fixing, economic boycotts, and other anticompetitive acts.
18. SULLIVAN & HOVANKAMP, supra note 14, at 75. The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 41-77 (West 1996), established the Federal Trade Commission to prevent individuals and
businesses from using unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts affecting commerce.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 77.
21. Under 15 U.S.C. § 26, attorney's fees are awardable only to a successful plaintiff, not to the
prevailing party.
22. Wineberg v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 48 F. Supp. 203, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1942); see also United States
v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954).
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objectives of the treble damage remedy.u Whether or not treble damages actually
promote effective deterrence or result in sham litigation is the subject of much dispute
and beyond the scope of this article." Suffice it to say that the combination of treble
damages, injunctive relief, and one-way attorneys' fees provides significant impetus
to private enforcement. Further, the statute of limitations is suspended under certain
circumstances for private parties when a government investigation of the same conduct
is pending.
Since World War I, private antitrust enforcement has exploded. Most scholars
believe the reason to be the treble damage remedy.Y A number of authors have been
critical of this "explosion" referring to it as a waste of resources.O The ratio of
private enforcement litigation to public enforcement litigation has varied from a low
of ten-to-one (private versus public) to twenty-to-one. 9
It has been suggested that private enforcement is every bit as effective as public
enforcement where the injury involved is of sufficient size or gravity to warrant filing
the suit and incurring the attendant costs." Former San Francisco Mayor Joseph
Alioto, a widely known antitrust lawyer, put it this way:
I have had some attorneys tell me, "You think you're the Attorney
General." I say, "No, I'm not the Attorney General, but I'm like him in
this case because Congress has said that the Attorney General doesn't
have enough men to handle this type of litigation, so it wants a lot of
private people to do some of it, and the courts have specifically said that
the purpose of the private treble damage action is to multiply the
enforcement agencies." That's their language, not mine! "To multiply the
enforcement agencies."'"
E. Private Equitable Relief
Injunctive relief in favor of the private plaintiff did not become available by statute
until 1964 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 26. That section provides:
24. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLIcY, THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTIcEs § 17.3, at 599 (1994).
25. In this connection, see Charles A. Sullivan, Breaking Up the Treble Play: Attacks on the Private
Treble Damage Antitrust Action, 14 SErON HALL L. REV. 17 (1983); Alfred L. Parker, The Deterrent
Effect of Private Treble Damage Suits: Fact or Fantasy, 3 N.M. L. REv. 287 (1973); Warren F.
Schwartz, An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEO. L.J. 1075 (1980); William
Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Private Antitrust Enforcement: The New Learning, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 405
(1985).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (1994).
27. Stephen C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74
GEO. L.J. 1001, 1001 (1986).
28. As an example of such criticism, see generally id.
29. Id. at 1003.
30. Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 416
(1970).
31. Workshop Ill. Government Enforcement And Private Actions, 42 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 208
(1973).
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Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for
and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having
jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a
violation of the antitrust laws, including sections 13, 14, 18, and 19 of this
title, when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive
relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted
by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings, and upon
the execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvi-
dently granted and a showing that the danger of irreparable loss or
damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue: Provided, that
nothing herein contained shall be construed to entitle any person, firm,
corporation, or association, except the United States, to bring suit in
equity for injunctive relief against any common carrier subject to the
provisions of the Act to regulate commerce, approved February fourth,
eighteen hundre: and eighty-seven, in respect of any matter subject to the
regulation, supervision, or other jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce
Commission?'
Although treble damages receive the most attention from prospective litigants and
commentators, injunctive relief will often afford a private plaintiff a more flexible
remedy to ensure the plaintiffs future economic viability.3 Not only can private
parties be protected through careful use of injunctive relief, but public purposes may
be served as well.' The injunction may be used to prohibit retaliation by an unhappy
defendant after the termination of the current litigation."
The Chancellor's foot may be large indeed when it comes to injunctive relief in
antitrust cases?6 The specific fact situation that would spawn the filing of the
litigation can be corrected as well as broad segments of the industryY The
government has routinely used injunctive relief in the vast preponderance of
government-initiated cases? Private plaintiffs seem to be taking advantage of
injunctive relief at an ever-increasing rate.
Typically, the elements that a private plaintiff must show to be entitled to injunctive
relief are: (1) a violation of the antitrust laws; (2) that has caused competitive injury
(injury to the public); and (3) that has likewise caused injury to the plaintiff
(causation)?9 If the wrong committed is a per se violation of the antitrust laws, then
the public injury is prasumed and does not have to be proven with specificity."
32. John J. Flynn, A Survey of Injunctive Relief Under State and Federal Antitrust Laws, 1967 UTAH
L. REV. 344, 345, 361.
33. Everette Maclntyre, Antitrust Injunctions: A Flexible Private Remedy, 1966 DUKE L.J. 22, 22.
34. Id. at 39.
35. Id.
36. Flynn, supra note 32, at 344.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 348.
39. Id. at 363.
40. Id. at 364.
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Against this backdrop, Oklahoma and Georgia initiated litigation against the NCAA.
A conscious decision not to seek monetary damages was made for several reasons.
First, and most important, was that the two institutions involved did not want to seek
damages that in essence would be paid by the other institutions that are members of
the NCAA. It was the unlawful framework of the NCAA television controls that
needed correcting. Second, the two institutions wanted the overriding motive behind
their initiation of this litigation to be clear: an unlawful cartel-like agreement should
be stopped. Third, both institutions hoped that the economic result of this litigation
would be ultimately to their benefit. This, however, was not their principal motivation.
Il1. The Litigation
On September 15, 1982, Oklahoma and Georgia instituted an action41 alleging a
violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The only named defendant was the
NCAA. The only relief sought was an injunction.
A. The Economic Issues
An antitrust case involves a variety of economic issues, some of which will be
matters of dispute and others of which will be matters to which both sides are willing
to stipulate. In NCAA, there were four major economic issues upon which the
protagonists and their experts failed to agree: (1) What constitutes price fixing and the
relationship between price fixing and output restrictions; (2) The relevant product
market for antitrust purposes; (3) Whether the NCAA's television plan constituted a
group boycott; and (4) Whether the television contracts between the NCAA and ABC
were procompetitive and output enhancing, or anticompetitive and output reducing.
We discuss each of these issues, and the plaintiffs' and defendant's economic
arguments, in turn.
1. Price Fixing
(A) The university-plaintiffs argued that both the total compensation for the
television package and the amounts to be paid for each class of game were fixed by
contract. In principle, the price of a game was only a "suggested" price to be
negotiated upwards or downwards by the participants. In practice, however, ABC had
always paid a uniform price that never deviated from the suggested price.42
Moreover, even after the 1982 addition of a second network game, the ground rules
for the bidders precluded price competition for any game. Priority in the choice of
games was determined by "control" dates, coin flips, and other artifices designed to
allocate games between the two ifetworks, at the suggested price.
Assuredly, the fact that there is one price in the market for a well-defined
homogeneous product does not in and of itself imply price fixing. In a purely
competitive market, one in which a nondifferentiable good is traded and in which
41. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D. Okla. 1982), affd
in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), afid, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
42. Id. at 1289.
1995]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1995
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
everybody knows what everybody else is about, it would be anticipated that all sellers
will charge the same price and all buyers will pay the same price. College football
games, however, do not comprise a nondifferentiable good. In contemporary terms,
college football fans would not be indifferent to watching the telecast of a game
between the Akron Zips and Northern Illinois, say, and one between Nebraska and
Penn State. Yet, under the NCAA-network agreements, had such games been telecast
on the same day in different regions of the country, each of the four participants
would receive the same rights payments. This would have been true regardless of the
number of stations carrying each of the games. The universities thus argued that these
equal payments constituted price fixing, precisely because they failed to reflect the
freely determined price differences the games would have commanded when marketed
as differentiated goods in a market that obeyed the laws of supply and demand 3
A second aspect to any price-fixing agreement is a restriction on output. So long
as the quantities buyers are willing to buy only increase when the price of the product
is reduced, a price fixed above the freely determined price will necessarily result in
a lower output than in a competitive market. The plaintiffs argued that it was
indisputable that the existing contracts effected a less-than-competitive market output
of college football telecasts. Under these contracts, except for the occasional part-time
overlap, only one game was televised in any section of the country at a given time on
a given fall Saturday, and at most two games were televised on any one day. Given
the freedom to do so, Oklahoma and Georgia by themselves stood ready and willing
to provide viewers alternative options and greater output of football telecasts, and a
lengthy line of other potential suppliers, headed by Notre Dame, formed directly
behind them. Thus, even though some sixty games a year had been telecast (nationally
and regionally) under the existing contract an even greater number would have
been telecast without the contract and, equally tellingly, viewer preference would have
played a greater role in determining which games were telecast and where.
03) The NCAA countered by observing that most if not all sellers "fix" price in the
strict sense that they quote a price for which they are willing to sell their products.
In many industries, these prices are nonnegotiable "take it or leave it" prices, and,
indeed, this is a common business practice. Thus, it is not necessarily true that a
cooperative agreement to provide a product, in this case a television program by the
name of NCAA Football, at a "suggested" price is a price-fixing arrangement. Rather,
the NCAA argued, the price agreement is ancillary to the provision of the product.
Any television program is sold at a particular price per episode, or a price for the
entire package; this is just normal business practice where a television series is
concerned. NCAA Football is just another television series, comparable to 60 Minutes
or Dallas.
The NCAA also made the tie between price fixing and output restrictions. It
argued, however, that NCAA Football was simply a partnership arrangement effected
solely to produce a distinctive product that no one of the participants could produce
on its own. A football game is, after all, a cooperative endeavor. The typical
43. Id. at 1293.
44. Id. at 1289-90.
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arrangement in the broadcast industry for the sale of such a product, a television
series, is to give exclusive rights to the buyer. That is certainly the case with a 60
Minutes or a Dallas. In this context of exclusivity, it would necessarily be true that
a restricted amount of the television program, NCAA Football, will be on the air. But
in the larger scheme of things, any such restriction is trivial when compared to the
totality of available television programming. After all, the NCAA suggested, NCAA
Football can at best only be made available on sixteen fall Saturdays out of the annual
total of 365 days on which viewers have access to an ample number of alternative
network and local programs for much of the day 5
2. Market Definition
The litigants agreed upon the United States as the relevant geographic market.
Agreement on the relevant product market was another matter. And, it was readily
apparent from their arguments on the price-fixing issue that how the product market
was defined would be critical in validating their positions on (a) whether the network
contracts resulted in a restriction of output and (b) whether the NCAA monopolized
"the market" through its television controls.
(A) The universities proffered televised college football as the relevant product
market. They supported this definition on a variety of grounds, all of which were
nested in the lack of substitutability between a college football game televised on a
fall Saturday afternoon and any other television programming.
A football game is a perishable commodity. The television tape of a game has
relatively little value once the result is known. A live televised game is a unique
commodity that viewers, particularly those with full-time jobs, cannot freely substitute
for television programs such as 60 Minutes or Dallas that are broadcast in the evening
or during the work week. Indeed, a college football telecast on a Saturday afternoon
is not even freely substitutable for a professional football telecast on a Sunday
afternoon, to say nothing of the cartoon shows and "B" movies that were the
commonly available staples on the stations that were not televising games on Saturday
afternoons. The plaintiffs supported their theoretical arguments with a variety of
empirical data related to broadcast ratings, audience demographics, and television
schedules.
The plaintiffs also noted that while the networks are the buyers of the broadcast
rights to college football, network demand for those rights is a derived demand, one
that is derived from advertisers' demand for time slots that may be used to reach
audiences with a particular set of demographic characteristics. That is, the rights are
only valuable to broadcasters because advertisers are willing to pay for the privilege
of sending their messages to the specific audience that has set aside a Saturday
afternoon to watch a college football telecast. This willingness manifested itself in
sponsors allocating 5.2% of their advertising budgets to NCAA Football, thus spending
two-and-a-half times as much per viewer to reach that particular audience than it
45. Defendant's Closing Argument Brief at 6-9, NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85 (1984) (No. 83-271).
46. Plaintiffs' Closing Argument Brief at 13-15, NCAA (No. 83-271).
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would have cost them to advertise on other network programs, although NCAA
football comprised only .0044% of total network programming time.47 In effect,
because of the uniqueness of the "product," and because the "product" was especially
cost effective, sponsors allocated to it a disproportionately large amount of their total
expenditures.
(B) The NCAA did not dispute the contention that it is the advertisers' willingness
to freely substitute between sponsorship alternatives which is a critical determinant of
the relevant product market. Indeed, NCAA based its market definition on this very
point. All commercial spots, the defendant suggested, are fungible. Any differences
in the value of those spots that are attributable to demographics, the times in which
they are broadcast, etc., are compensated for by "the market." Television programs
attracting audiences of half the size of NCAA Football, but with essentially the same
demographics, would cost sponsors half as much for the same time allocation.
Advertisers will, therefore, substitute freely between one thirty-second spot on NCAA
Football and two thirty-second spots on those demographic equivalents. That is why
the costs of a football sponsorship tended to move hand in hand with those of other
television sponsorships.48 The fact that advertisers did spend only 5.2% of their
advertising budgets on NCAA Football and less than 25% on all televised sports,
indicates they must have been freely substituting between that and other options,
perhaps even including billboard advertising. In effect, looking at the overall picture,
sponsors made relatively little use of NCAA Football and televised sports because so
many equally appeading and perfectly substitutable advertising alternatives were
available to them.
Still further, NCAA Football was so insignificant a part of television programming
that even with fewer games shown, the void could easily be filled by other programs.
With regard to fall sports programming alone, college football's share of the viewers
was less than 12%. The latter figure becomes minuscule when year-round sports
alternatives are included in the computation. Therefore, in a properly defined market,
the NCAA lacked the power to either secure a monopoly or to fix prices. At least,
that is what the NCAA argued.
3. Group Boycott
By definition, an economic boycott has economic implications for both those doing
the boycotting and ftose that are boycotted. Since a decision to do business with one
set of customers often implies the complementary decision to not do business with
others, whether any cne such decision constitutes a boycott is not necessarily apparent.
(A) The plaintiffs saw two ways in which the NCAA controls effectuated a group
boycott. On the one hand, by giving one, or even two, network(s) the exclusive right
to televise college football, and by not permitting its members to televise their games
outside of the network contract(s), the NCAA denied any other broadcasters the right
to purchase and televise college games!9 On the other hand, inasmuch as two teams
47. NCAA, 546 F. Sapp. at 1321.
48. Defendant's Closing Argument Brief at 6-9, NCAA (No. 83-271).
49. Plaintiffs' Closing Argument Brief at 2-3, NCAA (No. 83-271).
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are required to play a football game and a set of teams are required to play an entire
schedule, the threat of sanctions by the NCAA against a school that defied the
NCAA's ban on the independent sale of football television rights had the effect of a
group boycott against the defiant school.'
(B) The NCAA, however, had several justifications for its actions. First, the NCAA
alleged that it was attempting to protect its members' gate attendance.5 Second, it
was attempting to maintain a competitive balance that would be destroyed if television
revenues were to become concentrated in the hands of the major football powers. 2
Finally, the NCAA is a voluntary organization whose members are supposed to abide
by democratically-arrived-at rules that are designed to serve all members' interests,
rather than those of a select few.
4. The Competitive Aspects of the Contracts
It is undeniable that the contracts imposed horizontal restraints that to some degree
restricted output in some relevant product market. Whether they constituted per se
illegal price-fixing agreements is another matter. Once college football is seen to be
a unique product that cannot be provided unilaterally by any one school, it is also seen
that its provision requires mutual agreement among schools. Any such mutual
agreement among otherwise competing entities, however, necessarily implies one or
more horizontal restraints. Hence the restraints themselves must be subject to rule-of-
reason analysis wherein consumer welfare assumes pride of place and the salient issue
for the courts to decide becomes whether the restraints can be justified as
procompetitive 3 Three points were raised in this connection, with the litigants taking
opposing views on how to interpret such data that was available and that even at a
stretch might be viewed as germane.
(A) Reiterating its arguments with respect to the group boycott issues, the NCAA
argued that the intent of its television controls was to protect gate attendance at all
college football games, whether televised or not, and to enhance competitive balance.
The controls represented the collective will of the membership of a voluntary
organization. Insofar as competitive balance was enhanced, and insofar as gate
attendance was not adversely affected by television football, output as measured by
"live" attendance would tend to increase over and above what it would have been in
the absence of the controls. Accepting the NCAA's argument that there were no
anticompetitive effects of the contracts in its proffered relevant product market, the
television controls only resulted in procompetitive effects in the "live" college football
market.
In support of these contentions, the NCAA introduced both some early 1950s
surveys and some new econometric studies purporting to show the adverse effects that
50. Id. at 7-9.
51. Defendant's Closing Argument Brief at 11-13, NCAA (No. 83-271).
52. Id. at 14-15.
53. The Supreme Court had adopted this line of argument in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). For an extended discussion of these issues, see Ira Horowitz,
The Reasonableness of Horizontal Restraints: NCAA, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 214 (John E.
Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 2d ed. 1994).
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televised games had on attendance at nontelevised games, particularly at Division II
and Ell schoolsY The NCAA also offered testimony to the effect that its television
controls prevented the domination of the television market by a few select schools
and, as a result, prevented those schools from gaining economic and consequently on-
the-field competitive advantage over the others.5 Finally, the NCAA contended,
NCAA Football was actually a new product that could only be offered by the
partnership of Division I schools. Thus, the controls resulted in making available to
consumers a product that would not otherwise exist.
(B) The plaintiffs had ready counters to the NCAA's positions. The early surveys
were outdated and those commissioned expressly for the litigation were flawed.
Among other things, since there were football telecasts on every Saturday of the
season, there were no control dates enabling a comparison of attendance on days when
there was no televised-game competition and days when there was such competition.
Thus, there was no probative evidence to demonstrate the alleged adverse effects on
live attendance of football telecasts. Rather, the fact that the NCAA and ABC sought
to televise the most a'tractive game in the country or region, the televised game that
would be most competitive with a live game, showed the specious nature of the
argument.
In regard to maintaining competitive balance, essentially the same set of schools had
a history of appearing in both the telecasts and the weekly football rankings of the
elite. With true competitive balance, much greater variety would be seen in the
annual lists of the Top 25.
Finally, while in the strictest sense, membership in the NCAA is voluntary, there
is little doubt that it would be infeasible for any school desiring to play a college
football schedule to do so outside the NCAA's auspices.
Thus, the plaintiffs argued there was only one purpose and effect of the
NCAA's television controls: notably, to restrict output - the number of games
to be telecast - and to offer the networks exclusivity, so as to raise the price that
broadcasters, and ultimately sponsors, would be willing to pay for the television
package. These effects, in turn, reduce consumer choice and consumer welfare,
and are anticompetitive to boot.
B. The Trial
Walter Byers, the Executive Director of the NCAA, in his testimony at the trial,
was asked his opinion about what would happen if the NCAA greatly reduced the
restrictions on the colleges and simply allowed them to be on television no more
than, for instance, three times per year. His response was that for the NCAA to give
up the control that it had and diminish regulations substantially, it would bring
about a "hully-gully" situation.. It would be the "hully-gully plan."57 Byers testified
54. Defendant's Closing Argument Brief at 11-12, NCAA (No. 83-271); NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at
1295-96.
55. Defendant's Closing Argument Brief at 14, NCAA (No. 83-271).
56. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1310.
57. Record at 854, NCAA (No. CIV-81-1209-BU).
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that if the networks were left alone, they would act in a "hully-gully" manner."
This explanation by Byers speaks volumes as to why Oklahoma and Georgia had
to sue to get relief. If the czar of college football felt that anything other than the
NCAA plan was nonsense, bunk, and baloney, it is clear that compromise was not
possible. Therefore, the litigation was the only reasonable course for those seeking
freedom from unlawful restrictions.
The trial took approximately one week. It was a trial to the court since only
injunctive relief was sought. All the district judges for the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, the situs of the trial, had disqualified
themselves, and Judge Juan Burciaga from New Mexico was sitting by designation.
Some three months after the conclusion of the trial, in a forty-seven-page opinion,
the court found that the NCAA was a "classic cartel" that had controlled the price
and output of the televising of college football by "commandeering" the rights of
the member institutions.59
The court noted that the plaintiffs had proven that they had suffered antitrust
injury and that the plaintiffs would have realized substantial increased revenues but
for the NCAA controls.' The court examined the section 1 violations under both
the per se and rule-of-reason tests. The court found that the NCAA had not shown
any procompetitive justifications. The court found that the activities under section
1 of the Sherman Act were unlawful under either test.
[The] most pernicious aspect is that under the controls, the market is not
responsive to viewer preference. Every witness who testified on the
matter confirmed that the consumers, the viewers of college football
television, receive absolutely no benefit from the controls. Many games
for which there is a large viewer demand are kept from the viewers, and
many games for which there is little if any demand are nonetheless
televised.6
The court made it clear that the plaintiffs had sought no damages; they merely
sought relief in order to give them the opportunity to increase their profits through
competitive activities.62
The court was prophetic when it predicted that the result of this decision would
be more games being shown on television without the NCAA controls stifling the
competitive market place.
The court then went on to find the NCAA also guilty of group boycott and
monopolizing the market for the sale of college football television rights. The final
paragraph of the opinion prior to the issuance of the declaratory judgment and
permanent injunction clearly enunciates the court's view of the import of this decision:
58. "Hully-gully" is defined as "nonsense, bunk, baloney." HAROLD WENTWORTH & STUART B.
FLEXNER, DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SLANG 275 (1975)
59. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1309.
60. Id. at 1301.
61. Id. at 1318 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 1303.
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It is the Court's fond hope and genuine belief that the result of this
litigation will be an open and competitive market which will ultimately
serve the best interests of the football-playing colleges, the telecasters,
television advertisers and, most importantly, the viewers of college
football television. Congress had determined that free competition will
yield this result and that therefore competition shall be the rule of
commerce in our nation. By its decision today, the Court gives effect
to that rule.
After the trial court decision, much was written about the impact of this action
on the various constituencies. It was difficult to find any article that supports the
"rightness" of Oklahoma and Georgia for stopping what everybody ultimately agreed
was a classic, unlawful cartel. Somehow, that "rightness" got lost in the scramble
for the college football television dollar.
C. The Court of Appeals Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed most of Judge Burciaga's decision.' For the first
time, the government appeared to become interested in this private enforcement
effort. The Department of Justice filed an amicus brief in the Tenth Circuit
supporting Oklahorra and Georgia. Considering that this was during the Reagan Era
of non-antitrust enforcement, this position was indeed unique.
The government urged the Tenth Circuit not to use a per se test but, rather, to
employ a "truncated" rule-of-reason approach. Because of the nature of the restraint
on price and output, the government suggested that the utilization of the per se test
would be inappropriate.'
The government, however, urged the Tenth Circuit to affirm the lower court
decision. The government argued that Oklahoma and Georgia showed the
anticompetitive nature of the restraints imposed by the NCAA television plan. Also,
the government approved and urged affirmance of the injunctive relief granted by
Judge Burciaga.
The Tenth Circuit found that the plaintiffs did not have to show standing since
only injunctive relief was sought. Therefore, Brunswick,' a case involving treble
damages, was distinguishable. Also, the court noted: "The plaintiff seeks to
compete in a market free from artificial restrictions."'67 The court found there was
standing relying on 15 U.S.C. § 26.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the finding that the price fixing was per se illegal and
was not merely an ancillary restraint. The defendant's argument that the interbrand
competition enhancements (NCAA Football versus Dallas or M*A *S*H) outweighed
63. ld. at 1328 (emphasis added).
64. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aJJ'd, 468
U.S. 85 (1984).
65. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 18, Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v.
NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983) (No. 82-2148), afid, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
66. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo BowI-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
67. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1151 n.4.
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the intrabrand restrictions in the NCAA plan was unavailing. As did the trial court,
the Tenth Circuit distinguished Broadcast Music"8 from the NCAA situation
because of the lack of exclusivity present in Broadcast Music.
The Tenth Circuit did not find it necessary to consider the section 2 claim since
the affirmance of the section 1 price-fixing claim was an independent justification
for granting the injunction.'
The majority reversed the finding of a group boycott against the other broadcast-
ers. The court found that the colleges were not in competition with the broadcasters
and, therefore, could not engage in a group boycott against them under these facts.
The only relief granted to the NCAA in this circumstance was the remanding of
the matter to the trial court for a review of some of the broader aspects of the
previously issued injunction. After review of that injunction by the trial court, the
injunction remained substantially the same."0
The dissent found that the NCAA's plan was not anticompetitive. Rather, it was
designed to facilitate the purposes of the NCAA. The dissent lamented the
"subjugating the NCAA's educational goals . . . to the purely competitive
commercialism of 'every school for itself approach to television contract bargain-
ing."'M
To no one's surprise, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and gave its final
review of the NCAA plan.
D. The United States Supreme Court Decision
Three football seasons after the action was commenced, the United States
Supreme Court rendered its decision.72 The score was Oklahoma and Georgia 7,
NCAA 2. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision.'
The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission inserted themselves
into the process at this level. In the opening sentence of the amicus curiae brief in
support of affirmance, they stated: "The United States and the Federal Trade
Commission, which have primary responsibility for the preservation and promotion
of competition through enforcement of the federal antitrust laws, have a substantial
interest in ensuring that those laws are interpreted and applied in a manner that
promotes competition and consumer welfare."'74 As the Department of Justice had
done at the Tenth Circuit level, the United States again supported affirmance of the
rule-of-reason determination in favor of Oklahoma and Georgia.' Because the
conduct was not of a type with which the courts had substantial experience and did
68. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
69. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1159 n.16.
70. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, No. CIV-81-1209-BU (W.D. Okla. Oct. 31,
1984) (order reviewing scope of injunctive relief).
71. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1168 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
72. The suit was commenced Sept. 8, 1981, and the Supreme Court decision was rendered June 27,
1984.
73. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
74. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, NCAA (No. 83-271).
75. Id. at 3.
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not involve a naked restraint, however, the government urged a truncated rule-of-
reason approach rather than the application of the per se test.
7 6
The government pointed out the crucial distinction between NCAA and Broadcast
Music. The distinction was one of requisite exclusivity in the production and sale
of the product. In its amicus brief, the government states, in part:
In particular, we believe that the NCAA has failed to explain the
necessity of its assuming the role of exclusive selling agent for the
colleges, i.e., how the product would be damaged if colleges were
granted the right to contract independently with local stations for the
broadcasting of individual games (see Pet. App. 70a). Indeed, the courts
below noted this as a major distinction between the present case and
Broadcast Music, in which, although the performing rights societies
organized umbrella sales agreements, individual authors retained the
power to sell the performing rights to their compositions on an
individual basis (Pet. App. 14a, 93a). Even if it were found to be
procompetitive for there to be a weekly NCAA "game of the week" on
network television, that would not require that all schools whose games
are not selected to be shown in any given week be prevented from
selling their television rights to local, regional or national broadcast-
ers."
The government contended that the "most compelling reason" to disregard the
arguments of the NCAA was that it had failed to "present a valid efficiency
argument. ' At this juncture of the litigation, with a procompetitive result clearly
in sight, both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, the
agencies with the "primary responsibility for the preservation and promotion of
competition through enforcement of the federal antitrust laws,"7' jumped on the
universities' bandwagon at the last minute. Because of the "importance of the
issues" raised by this case,' one can only wonder why this NCAA scheme had not
been the subject of public enforcement prior to this time? What had caused both
public enforcement agencies to overlook a highly publicized, nonsecret price fixing
and output-limitation scheme? Why did it take private enforcement (and private
resources) to bring about this result? If these issues were so important, the scheme
so public, and the responsibility for preservation and promotion of competition so
primary with the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, where
were they during the! years that this was proceeding?
Justice Stevens made it clear that the Supreme Court relied heavily on the district
court findings concerning the wrongdoing of the NCAA and the total lack of
effective justification for its actions. Describing the district court's findings as
76. Id.
77. Id. at 21 n.20.
78. Id. at 23.
79. Id. at 1.
80. Id.
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"unambiguous,"'" "amply supported,"" "well-supported,"83 and on a "solid
basis," the Supreme Court praised the work of the district court. The NCAA did
not request the Supreme Court to set aside any of the district court's findings. 5
Rather, the NCAA contended that the previous decisions were wrong as a matter
of law.
The Court determined that the NCAA television plan limited output and restricted
the right of any institution to make a sale of television rights outside the plan.'
This was the heart of Oklahoma and Georgia's contentions, and the district court and
the court of appeals also concurred in this finding.
The Supreme Court decided not to apply the per se rule because the industry
involved was one in which horizontal controls were necessary if there was to be any
product available to sell at all. In other words, if there was not cooperation between
the competing teams, their conferences, and other necessary entities, there could be
no television rights to sell.' Because of the action taken by the court of appeals
regarding the group boycott and section 2 contentions, all that was before the
Supreme Court was the section 1 Sherman Act violations dealing with the restriction
of output and price fixing.
The Court determined that a rule-of-reason approach should be employed. It
affirmed the prior decisions applying the rule of reason. Specifically, it approved
the finding that there were no procompetitive efficiencies involved in the NCAA
plan."8 Indeed, the Court determined that the plan was unresponsive to viewer
preferences. It recognized the importance of the protection of the fan in this
inquiry.' In this connection, the Court said:
The anticompetitive consequences of this arrangement are apparent.
Individual competitors lose their freedom to compete. Price is higher
and output lower than they would otherwise be, and both are unrespon-
sive to consumer preference. This latter point is perhaps the most
significant, since "Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer
welfare prescription."' A restraint that has the effect of reducing the
importance of consumer preference in setting price and output is not
consistent with this fundamental goal of antitrust law. Restrictions on
price and output are the paradigmatic examples of restraints of trade
that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit."
81. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 119.
82. Id. at 111.
83. Id. at 119.
84. Id. at 112.
85. Id. at 98 n.15.
86. Id. at 94.
87. Id. at 101.
88. Id. at 114.
89. Id. at 107.
90. Id. at 106-07 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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On the issue of market power, the Court made it clear that market power - the
power to raise price and/or to restrict output - was not required to be shown in this
case because of the naked nature of this restraint. Had the NCAA plan been merely
an ancillary restraint, then the plaintiffs would have had the obligation to show
market power. Notwithstanding the above, the Court found that the plaintiffs had
proven that the NCAA had market power. The Court made the same prediction that
each Court before it had made: Without the NCAA plan, output will go up.9 The
Court called that a "compelling demonstration" that the NCAA plan is anticom-
petitive and does not serve any legitimate purpose.'
Finally, the Court held "that the record supports the district court's conclusion that
by curtailing output and blunting the ability of member institutions to respond to
consumer preference, the NCAA has restricted rather than enhanced the place of
intercollegiate athletics in the nation's life."'9
Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented. In a sixteen-page opinion,
the NCAA was praised as a valuable, necessary organization. The NCAA plan was
praised as essential to protecting live gate attendance as well as equalizing the
competitive balance among the college football-playing schools."
The dissent made two predictions that deserve review slightly more than a decade
later. These two predictions were:
(1) That college football itself as a product to be sold for television presentation
is threatened by unbridled competition." Presumably, "unbridled" means free, fair,
and open, not unlawful. The question then becomes: "Has a decade of 'unbridled'
competition threatered the viability of college football as a product desirable to
televise?"
(2) While noting that the College Football Association had put together a
television plan of its own, the dissent predicted "antitrust problems" for the CFA.
That prediction, however, is based upon the assumption that the CFA plan will
"contain[s] features :imilar to those condemned as anticompetitive by the Court."'
With these rather diverse predictions of freedom versus destruction, increased
output versus glut, and increased attention to consumer preferences (the fan) versus
destruction of live gate attendance and loss of competitive balance, the colleges set
out on the next leg of their economic journey. What was referred to as "college
91. Id. at 119.
92. Id. at 120.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 124 (White, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 122 (White, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 127 n.2 (White, J., dissenting). The CFA plan differed in several significant respects from
the NCAA plan. Member3 of the CFA made an outright transfer of the rights to sell television coverage
of their games to the CFA. The CFA then conducted the negotiations with the network and made the
contracts in typical joint venture fashion. Moreover, unused rights (those games that were not selected
by the network) were conveyed back to the CFA members for their own use. This added a
nonexclusivity element to the CFA plan that had been missing in the NCAA plan. These distinctions,
however, were not mentioned by Justice White in his dissent.
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football's biggest fumble" began to bounce around on the economic playing field.
Who recovered the "fumble" and what use they made of it is set forth hereafter.
IV. The Immediate Consequences of NCAA
Judge Burciaga determined the relevant product to be live college football
television. Through 1981, however, the product demanded by the networks and sold
by the NCAA was the exclusive right to live college football television. That
exclusive right was the product exchanged in the 1982-85 regular-season over-the-
air NCAA-network contracts. These did not differ substantially from their
predecessors. The principal difference was that ABC and CBS would share equally
in the revenues and coverage. The rules governing the allocation of games were
such as to minimize the chances that two games would be televised simultaneously.
This would also be true of games cablecast by the Turner Broadcasting System
(WTBS). In effect, then, what the seller was selling and what the buyers were
buying was time-slot exclusivity for live college football television.
Despite the dual over-the-air coverage, as shown in table 1, there would be only
four exposures beyond the twenty-four of the 1980-81 contract. ABC would lose
the exclusive right to NCAA Football and have only fourteen exposures in 1982-83,
but it would pay essentially the same minimum aggregate fee as it previously
paid.'
TABLE 1. NCAA NETWORK CONTRACTS
Year No. of Exposures Min. Agg. Fee Com. Mins Price/Exp. Price/Com. Min.
1978 23 $29 Million 506 $1,260,860 $57,312
1979 23 $29 Million 506 $1,260,860 $57,312
1980 24 $31 Million 506 $1,291,660 $61,261
1981 24 $31 Million 506 $1,291,660 $61,264
1982 28 $59 Million 728 $2,107,140 $81,043
1983 28 $64 Million 728 $2,285,710 $87,912
1984 28 $68.5 Million 728 $2,446,420 $94,093
1985 28 $72 Million 728 $2,571,420 $98,901
A more detailed analysis reveals scheduled ABC payments of an additional
61.22% per exposure (averaged over the average 1978-81 price and the average
1982-85 price) for 36.89% fewer exposures (averaged over the average 23.5
exposures in 1978-81 and its fourteen annual exposures in 1982-85). The latter data
imply an arc elasticity of demand of -.3689/.6122 = -.60 > -1. That is, ABC's
97. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1290 (W.D. Okla. 1982),
affd in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), affd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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demand for time-slot-exclusive college television football seems to have been
relatively inelastic. It is not unreasonable to generalize this inelasticity to industry
demand for time-slot-exclusive college television football.
It is also self-evident, as the courts recognized, that unless there is a serious
deterioration in live attendance and its accordant gate receipts, the participants'
marginal cost of televising a previously scheduled game is zero. This implies an
infinite marginal-cost elasticity. An inelastic demand and a highly elastic marginal
cost are the two classic economic conditions encouraging the formation and suste-
nance of a cartel. It would have been surprising in this environment, if a television
cartel had not formed! Moreover, in this particular situation, the basic framework
for such a cartel, the NCAA, already existed, although its original raisons d'etre ran
far afield from those that would impel the emergence of a television cartel.
Defections and the formation of competing cartels occurred because some of the
other economic conditions required to sustain a cartel did not and do not exist. Most
specifically, all college football games do not comprise a standard product. With
well in excess of fifty major football-playing schools, the market for their television
rights is not concentrated on the sellers' side. There is a potential fringe of small
sellers, rapid entry i:3 easily effected and requires less than one-week's notice, and
there were few broadcasters that qualified as buyers for either over-the-air or cable
network packages. It was, therefore, only a matter of time before the conditions
unfavorable to collusion overcame those favorable to it, and that some cartel
members would bclt. Indeed, this is precisely what prompted the suit that
eventuated in NCAA.
While the negotiated CFA-NBC agreement was on hold, sponsors buying two-
year packages in the NCAA's 1982-83 contracts would have to pay $60,000 for a
thirty-second spot, or $120,000 per commercial minute.98 Over this period, the
average price ABC was to pay the NCAA for a commercial minute would be
.5($81,043) + .5($87,912) = $84,500. With an allowed total of 364 commercial
minutes, ABC's projected gross profit on NCAA Football would be $(120 -
84.5)Kx(364) = $12.9 million per year. As seen in table 1, under the 1980-81
contract, ABC paid $61,264 per commercial minute for its permitted total of 506
commercial minutes. Sponsors buying two-year packages paid $54,000 for a thirty-
second spot. Hence, over the previous period, ABC's annual gross profit was $(108
- 61.3)Kx506 = $23.6 million. While ABC's gross profit on NCAA Football
declined by 45%, itt; net profit for Saturday afternoon programming would have
declined by a lesser amount, because of production-cost savings and any profits
98. Radio-TV's Football Tab: $493.7 Million, BROADCASTING, Aug. 9, 1982, at 38. As a caveat,
except for the data presented before the district court, most of the data relating to the dollar value of
contracts, the number of telecasts, the rates charged to sponsors, and the like, are estimates. Upon
occasion, different sources provide slightly different estimates, none of which result in substantively
different inferences. In the interests of consistency, however, where possible, we rely upon a single
source that would seem to be the best source. In particular, for example, where CFA schools and
contracts are involved, we rely upon the data provided by the CFA. Broadcasting publishes an annual
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earned on alternative programs it broadcast in the 24 - 14 = 10 time slots of
approximately three hours each that would have been freed up for alternative
television programming, in lieu of college football telecasts. Since CBS was also
scheduled to price its NCAA package in the vicinity of $60,000 per thirty seconds,
in combination, the two networks would earn approximately the same gross profit
from NCAA Football as ABC alone had earned under the 1980-81 contract."
Sponsors would pay about 10% more for a thirty-second spot, and viewers would
have the opportunity to watch about 17% more network games and 17% more
minutes of commercials. These computations notwithstanding, in combination, ABC
and CBS were estimated to have lost an annual total of perhaps $8 million from
their 1983 NCAA contracts." Such losses imply that the advertising rates actually
received and/or the number of time slots actually sold in the absence of total
exclusivity did not live up to the networks' prior demands and expectations.
The NCAA-WTBS two-year cable contract gave the NCAA an additional $8.8
million per year and WTBS nineteen exposures per year.'' Most of the latter
games were Saturday telecasts, with some Thursday night games and a Sunday
game thrown in as well. The contract's timing is at least partially explained by
noting that in 1980 there were only 15.5 million cable subscribers, or 19.9% of
television households;"° in 1983, these figures were 25 million and 34.0%, respec-
tively. 3 It would seem that WTBS was buying credibility as much as it was
buying a profit source with its purchase. Indeed, in the ensuing years, there has
doubtless been a complementing relationship between the increased numbers of
cable households, which by 1990 numbered 52 million, or 56.4% of all television
homes, and televised sports in general and college television football in particu-
lar.
104
Over the 1982-83 period, then, the NCAA and its member schools increased their
annual take from the sale of regular-season cable and network television broadcast
rights to about $70.3 million from what had been $31 million. 5 The sale of local
radio rights and those to delayed telecasts added another $3.5 million to $10.6
million to the pie,"° with about 150 schools sharing that pie. The average.receipts
from regular-season televised football more than doubled from about $225,000 to
99. Specifically, from the above calculations, both ABC and CBS would earn an annual gross profit
of $12.9 million, giving a total annual gross profit of $25.8 million. The latter figure is 9.3% greater than
the ABC figure of $23.6 million.
100. Martzke, supra note 4, at 3C.
101. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1292; Radio-TVs Football Tab: $493.7 Million, supra note 98, at 39.
102. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 556 (1991)
[hereinafter 1991 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. The $70.3 million figure is arrived at by adding the $8.8 million paid by WTBS to $61.5
million, which is computed from the data in Table I as the average of the 1982 and 1983 figures for the
over-the-air network contracts.
106. Radio-TV's Football Tab: $493.7 Million, supra note 98, at 38; Broadcasters To Spend $536
Million on Football, BROADCASTING, Aug. 8, 1983, at 40.
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a little more than $500,000 per school."' But not everybody was a winner under
the new arrangements.
Subject to the previously noted caveat about attendance, there is no cost to the
participants for having their games televised. Thus, the NCAA member schools as
a group were better off to the pleasant tune of about $40 million under the 1982-83
contracts than they were in 1980-81. On the surface, fans of televised football,
particularly those residing in cable households, also benefitted. The total number of
exposures jumped from the earlier total of twenty-four to forty-seven, and due to
the networks' increasing reliance on regional telecasts, the number of games shown
increased from fifty-one in 1981 to seventy-six in 1983."° Thus, approximately
one out of every seven games played was televised someplace. Viewer choice was
enhanced. Looking below the surface, sponsors do not spend $60,000 for thirty
seconds of time unle:ss they expect that expenditure to generate at least as much in
future profits. Whether consumers of the products promoted ultimately pay some
of the costs of the sp~nsorships through higher product prices is, at a minimum, an
arguable issue.
ABC, CBS, WTBS, and, most critically, the potential sponsors of the games were
guaranteed time-slot exclusivity with respect to televised college football and its
audiences. This guarantee initially helped maintain the value of the broadcast rights.
Thus, while ABC did lose exclusivity to college football, its management apparently
believed that the part of the loaf it did retain was better than none, as it was willing
to share the telecasts with CBS. ABC was not in the best of all bargaining
positions. Management wanted college football to diversify its fall-weekend
programming package at a time when its network competitors, NBC and CBS, had
the rights to the Sunday telecasts of professional (NFL) football. Subject only to the
"winner's curse,"'" CBS and Turner would be better off than before, having added
what appeared to their managements to be an attractive programming option to offer
potential sponsors. NBC and the fledgling cable sports network, ESPN, would seem
to have been clear losers; more college football was being televised and they were
left out in the cold.
The sixty-two member schools comprising the CFA recognized they would still
be better off financially in 1982-83 if they did not have to share even soon-to-be-
enhanced televised football revenues with the some ninety other Division I football-
107. The computatiois are rough approximations obtained as follows. The NCAA lists 148
institutions as sharing in football television revenues, Institutions Sharing in Revenue, 1980, NA'L
COLLEGIATE AT-tLETic ASS'N, Dec. 2, 1980, at 1-2. Adding $3.2 million in radio and delayed television
rights, Radio-TV's Football Tab: $493.7 Million, supra note 98, at 38, to the $31 million paid by ABC
(Table 1) and dividing by 148 gives a figure of $231,000. Similarly, adding $(3.5 + 10.6)/2 = $7.05
million to $70.3 million and dividing by 148 gives a figure of $523,000.
108. The figures on exposure are taken by adding the 19 exposures on WTBS to the data provided
in Table 1. The 51-game and 76-game figures are from The Growth of College Football, SIDELINES, Oct.
1990, at 3.
109. Under "winner's curse." the winning bidder, by paying more than the second highest bidder,
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playing colleges of the NCAA. With the thought becoming father to the deed, the
CFA signed a four-year, $180 million contract with NBC that would assure each
member at least $1 million and two telecasts, thus doubling what the NCAA
contract promised."' Put otherwise, $45 million a year divided sixty-two ways
translates into a lot more money for the recipients than does $70 million divided
150 ways. And the agreement would permit a school as many as seven appearances
in two years."'
The CFA-NBC agreement was in many ways comparable to the NCAA's
contracts with ABC and CBS. The agreement called for fourteen national telecasts
and thirty-two regional telecasts."' It also called for at least eleven Saturday-night
telecasts in 1982 and six to twelve prime-time telecasts in subsequent seasons." 3
But the agreement could only promise NBC the right of first refusal to over-the-air
time-slot exclusivity for the televised home football games of a subset of Division
I-A schools."' Thus, while the agreement threatened to deny NCAA Football the
home games of most of the major football powers, excepted from these were the
home games of the Big Ten and Pacific Ten teams. In fact, ABC and CBS had
escape clauses in their contracts with the NCAA precisely because of the threat."5
At a minimum, then, had the CFA-NBC contract been allowed to proceed, the
NCAA would surely have been forced to accept severely reduced payments for its
television program, one that would have featured the Big Ten and the Pacific Ten.
The agreement also raised the specter of competing telecasts and competing sellers'
cartels.
In point of fact, and although the NCAA was cut out of the dealing, the specter
became a reality in 1984 with the Supreme Court's pro-CFA decision." 6 The CFA
television cartel went forward first with an over-the-air version of NCAA Football,
repackaged as CFA Football. This package called for thirteen exposures of at least
twenty games at a price of $12 million, rather than $45 million or even $31
million."7 Now, however, ABC rather than NBC was the buyer. ABC had been
willing to pay at least $13 million for a limited number of games. The CFA,
however, preferred to exchange a lower fee for increased television exposure. The
CFA also sold a fifteen-exposure cable package to ESPN for $9.3 million, which
was more in line with the NCAA's earlier contract with WTBS."' By 1984,
almost 40% of the 84 million television households accessed cable." 9 When the






116. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
117. Cross-Over Lawsuit Filed: Action Hopes to Force CFA SchooLs to Play on CBS TV, SIDELINs,
Sept. 1984, at 1-2 [hereinafter Cross-Over Lawsuit Filed].
118. See supra notes 101-04.
119. 1991 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 102, at 556.
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final bill was paid, ABC and ESPN contributed $22.4 million to the CFA's
coffers.'"
The NCAA's 1982-83 over-the-air and cable contracts gave the approximately 150
member schools an average of $70 million/150 = $467,000 with such football-
playing powers as Notre Dame and Michigan being well above the average, and
such lesser lights as Toledo and Tennessee-Chattanooga being well below it. A
school appearing in a game televised nationally by ABC received approximately
$500,000; a school appearing in a regional telecast received approximately
$400,000."'
The CFA, which originally planned to take $5.3 million off the top of its 1984
contracts to give each of its now sixty-three members $84,500, ended up giving
each member $100,000.'" In addition, a school appearing in a national game
received about $275,000; a school appearing in a regional game or an ESPN telecast
received at least $200,000." As under the NCAA program, each school was
permitted a limited number of appearances. Thus, initially at least, even the elite
among the CFA powers were doubtless worse off under the new contract than under
the old.
Left out of the CFA program, Turner Broadcasting settled for a twelve-game, $6
million to $8 million contract with the Southeastern Conference (SEC)."u In this
and other conference packages, schools that actually appeared in a televised game
would ordinarily receive a double share in the final division of the spoils.
Conference packages had been made feasible by NCAA. The CFA network contracts
only gave the networks the right of first refusal to any CFA game; the rest were up
for grabs and complete time-slot exclusivity was a thing of the past.'
The more prominent football-playing schools within a conference would likely
earn more from a conference package than would their less prominent brethren.
Such differences would nonetheless be less pronounced than would be the case
under an NCAA or CFA package, absent a conference sharing rule for broadcast
rights. Thus, on average, the SEC's ten members reaped at least twice as much from
selling their broadcast rights in 1984 as they had in 1983, earning approximately
$100,000 + {[$(22.4 - 6.3)]/63 = $256,000) from the CFA's over-the-air and cable
contracts, and another $700,000 from the conference package." As a group, the
120. Cross-Over Lawsuit Filed, supra note 117, at 1-3.
121. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1290 (W.D. Okla. 1982),
affid in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), afd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
122. Cross-Over Lawsuit Filed, supra note 117, at 2-3. The $5.3 million figure is arrived at by
taking 25% of the total of the $12 million that was expected to be paid by ABC and the $9.3 million that
was expected to be paid by ESPN. As noted above, the actual total ended up being $22.4 million.
123. Id.
124. A New Spin on the Football, BROADCASTING, Aug. 6, 1984, at 41; Press Release from Paul
Kagan Associates, 1984 Pay TV Sports (Aug. 3, 1984) (on file with author).
125. Cross-Over Lawsuit Filed, supra note 117, at 1-3.
126. As noted in supra note 122 and accompanying text, each CFA school received $100,000 from
the pool, which reduces the initial total of $22.4 million that remains to be divided up among the 63
members by $6.3 million; or, the members would average ($16.1 million)/63 = $256,000 from the
remainder. In addition, the SEC members would average about ($7 million)/10 = $700,000 from the
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CFA members' total 1984 take of about $34 million fell more than 10% short of
their 1983 take of $38 million to $40 million. 27
The $34 million is the sum of the CFA's ABC and ESPN contracts, the SEC-
WTBS contract, and other agreements reached by individual conferences and teams
with syndicators such as Raycom, Metrosports, and Katz Sports, plus the additional
payments made to CFA teams that appeared in so-called crossover games such as
Nebraska-UCLA, Notre Dame-Southern California, and Penn State-Iowa, that were
televised as part of other individual conference packages, beyond the CFA package.
In the former regard, a syndicator acts as a broker that buys the secondary rights
to a team's or a conference's games and then resells those rights to individual
stations or networks. In the latter regard, for about $10 million, CBS was able to
assure itself of another fourteen-game package in its 1984 weekend schedule by
gaining the right of first refusal to the Big Ten and Pacific Ten home games (at a
cost of $9.5 million)." These pacts gave those member schools an average of
$475,000.' For these schools, then, their newfound freedom from the NCAA's
control was a financial push. An additional $400,000 a game was paid a school
participating in a CBS-televised crossover game in which the courts forced a
reluctant CFA school to play against its scheduled Big Ten or Pacific Ten
opponent.'30
The Big Ten, the Pacific Ten, and some smaller conferences comprised by teams
outside the CFA also had syndicated packages that added both games and perhaps
another $10 million to the television pie.'3' As a result of all of this, television
viewers who in 1983 had available a total of seventy-six games, saw that total
expanded to 206 games in 1984.132 Assuredly, because the preponderance of these
games were televised regionally and because many were available only via cable,
"dishless" viewers could only choose among a subset of the games. Nevertheless,
by any criteria, viewer and consumer choice was greatly enhanced.
The increased output and the inability to guarantee time-slot exclusivity for the
telecasts meant that the buyers would be paying about $55 million, as opposed to
the previous $70 million.' The sixty-three members of the CFA would be
dividing $34 million among themselves, rather than the $45 million promised in the
1982-83 contract with NBC.'" The networks televising the games also began to
feel the effects of competing games and potentially fractionated audiences through
their advertising rates. Now ABC and CBS would only be able to charge sponsors
WTBS contract, the $7 million figure being the midpoint of the estimated range for that contract.
127. TV Revenue May Be More Than Expected: Figures Could Match $34.9 Million of 1982,
SIDELINES, Nov. 1984, at I [hereinafter TV Revenue]. This article also asserts that CFA members
received $34.9 million from the 1982 NCAA packages. Id.
128. A New Spin on the Football, supra note 124, at 41.
129. Id. at 15. With 20 Big Ten and Pacific Ten teams, $9.5 nillion/20 = $475,000.
130. TV Revenue, supra note 127, at 1.
131. A New Spin on the Football, supra note 124, at 41.
132. The Growth of College Football, supra note 108, at 3.
133. Id.
134. A New Spin on the Football, supra note 124, at 41.
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$27,500 for a thirty-second slot, rather than the previous $60,000.' Exclusivity
really is a valued property, and, in what may have turned out to be an unwelcome
surprise to some of the CFA membership, competition really does work. When an
insufficient number of new buyers enters a market, an upward shift in supply
effected by the entrance of new seller cartels into that market, combined with a
downward shift in the extant individual buyers' demand curves effected by the
elimination of exclusivity, will result in lower unit prices.
Confronted with the expanded choices in televised games, Division I-A fans
responded with a 1% increase in attendance, from 25.4 million in 1983, to 25.8
million in 1984. 6 Indeed, attendance at all college football games, including those
of the "minor players," increased between 1983 and 1984 from 36.3 million to 36.65
million, an all-time high that surpassed the 36.5-million figure of 1982 and one that
has not since been surpassed! 1' And, to put these figures in better perspective,
between 1970 and 1975, attendance increased from 29.5 million to 31.7 million,
with a further increase to 35.6 million occurring by 1980.38
While the NCAA might have argued that the promotional effect of the limited
television exposure of NCAA Football was to increase live football attendance
during the 1970s, relaxing the controls in 1984 did nothing to reverse the trend.
Any preliminary conclusions to be drawn from all of this would be extremely
tenuous because in 1984 the principal protagonists had precious little time to
organize their efforts. The Supreme Court handed down its decision in late June,
and "fall" football seasons started around Labor Day. A truer test of the initial
effects of removing the controls came with the 1985 and 1986 contracts.
In 1985, fifty-two CFA members agreed to participate in two-year agreements the
organization signed with ABC and ESPN that were worth an average of $27.5
million per season.' This was approximately $5 million more than the 1984
contracts were worth to the sixty-three participating schools. The eight schools of
the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), together with the University of Miami, Army,
and Navy, who had participated in the 1984 agreement, opted to go it on their
own." In the new agreement, the participation pool increased to an annual aver-
age of $135,000 p-r school. 4' The restrictions imposed on individual schools'
appearances included having ABC provide two appearances per season to teams
from the Big Eight, the SEC, the Southwest Conference (SWC), the Western
135. Id.
136. Attendance Sklws Little Change, SIDELINES, Sept. 1989, at 11.
137. U.S. DEP'T O COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 252 (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 229 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
138. 1986 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 137, at 229.
139. 52 Schools Agree to Join TV Package, SIDELINES, Feb. 1985, at 2; TV Pacts Worth More Per
School: ABC, ESPN Sign 2-Year Agreements, SIDELINES, April 1985, at 1 [hereinafter TV Pacts Worth
More Per School].
140. 52 Schools Agree to Join TV Package, supra note 139, at 2.
141. TV Pacts Worh More Per School, supra note 139, at 1.
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Athletic Conference (WAC), and Northern and Southern Independents.42 Each
school's appearances on ABC and ESPN were limited to four per season and two
"wild card" appearances on ABC.'43
Including payments for other conference packages, syndication, and pay
television, it was estimated that total television revenues received by the fifty-two
participants would average about $36.5 million a year, compared to the $34 million
divided among sixty-three schools in 1984.'" This is an increase of 12.8% in the
average rights payments to each of the fifty-two 1985-86 participants, which reached
about $700,000 a year.
In 1984, the eight ACC schools sat squarely on the left side of that year's
average; each received the minimum participation fee of $100,000. By opting out
of the agreement and joining the Big Ten and Pacific Ten on CBS with their own
$3.5 million two-year deal, the ACC schools more than doubled their previous re-
ceipts, averaging $220,000 a year.45 This figure was dwarfed by the Big Ten
schools, which are estimated to have averaged $900,000 a year from that
conference's packages with CBS and TBS.'" The Pacific Ten schools also dwarfed
the ACC schools, averaging about $700,000 a year from the conference's CBS and
TBS packages. 47
The University of Miami was also a big winner, signing a two-year deal with
CBS under which for about $2 million the network would televise three or four of
Miami's 1985-86 home games. 4" The SEC teams would seem to have taken the
biggest hit, with their average payments from the conference package with WTBS
falling to about $250,000.14" Alone among these conference schools, however, the
SEC schools also participated in the CFA's packages, so that their annual payments
again averaged in the neighborhood of $1 million.5 0 Pulling this together,
broadcasters would pay an annual total of at least $(36.5 + 1.75 + 7.0 + 9.0 + 1)
= $55.25 million to the principal players. This figure was only slightly more than
they paid in 1984 and still considerably less than they paid the NCAA in 1983 for
the rights to college television football. 5' With the erosion of time'-slot exclusivity
and the increase in the viewers' options, thirty-second spots on ABC's CFA Football
were priced at $45,000 and $42,000 in 1985 and 1986, respectively, down from
$60,000 in 1982-83.' In 1986, CBS paid $575,000 to televise a Big Ten




145. Football Rights in 1985 Hit $530 Million, BROADCASTING, Aug. 5, 1985, at 33.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 34.
148. Colleges Rethinking Football Packages, BROADCASTING, Feb. 4, 1985, at 37.
'149. lId
150. Id.
151. See supra tbl. 1.
152. A New Spin on the Football, supra note 124, at 41; Football Rights in 1985 Hit $530 Million,
supra note 145, at 33.
153. Hal Lancaster, Colleges Scrambling to Avoid Loss In a Glutted TV Football Market, WALL ST.
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In 1984, there were close to sixty exposures on ABC, CBS, WTBS, and ESPN,
and a total of about 206 games in all, or almost one out of every three games
played was televised." By 1986, the number of exposures approached ninety,
principally as a result of a three-package, forty-game offering that WTBS either
broadcast or syndicated.s' Cable's USA network also got in on the act, carrying
its own twelve-game package." The total number of televised games, however,
actually fell to about 150 in 1985 and to about 100 in 1986." The narrowing of
the gap between the number of exposures and the number of games telecast was
caused by some double-dipping wherein the same game might be televised over
more than one outlet. Despite the increased number of exposures and the fact that
45.6% of all households now had access to cable, total attendance at Division I-A
football games in 19:36 was virtually identical to that in 1984, although the average
attendance per game dipped by .5%."' Attendance at all football games dropped
by 340,000 between the 1984 peak year and 1985 (.9%), recovering 76,000 (.2%)
of the loss in 1986.' These data are insufficient to lead to the conclusion that the
spread of television football was starting to take its toll on live attendance, but the
colleges saw in them an ominous warning signal.
It seems apparent, then, that the initial effects of the elimination of the NCAA's
cartel-imposed controls and the price fix were exactly what economic theory would
have predicted: even with the emergence of several smaller sellers' cartels in the
form of individual conferences, rivalry among them would result in buyers paying
a lower price for the product, college football broadcast rights, for what might well
be a greater amount of product, college football exposures. Some sellers, notably
those football-playing schools that were not football powers belonging to either the
CFA, the Big Ten, or the Pacific Ten, suffered more short-term financial losses
from the television cartel's breakup than did the major powers. But if the latter
schools anticipated enormous gains in football revenues as a iesult of not having to
share the football-generated wealth with the former schools, the early signs were
that they would be in for a major disappointment. The historic growth in football
television revenues had abated. Unfortunately for both the sellers and the buyers,
J., Sept. 23, 1986, at 37 (based on information provided by Michigan's Athletic Director, Don Canham).
154. The "close to 6)" figure comes from adding a WTBS 12-game package and a 15-game ESPN
package. A New Spin on the Football, supra note 124, at 41, to the 13 exposures in the CFA-ABC
contract, Cross-Over Lawsuit Filed, supia note 117, at 1, and about 15 exposures in the CBS contract
with the Big Ten and Pacific Ten, Football Rights in 1985 Hit $530 Million, supra note 145, at 33, and
then allowing for the fact these are the lower bounds on the actual number of exposures. The total
number of telecasts is taken from The Growth of College Football, supra note 108, at 3. There were 606
games played in 1984. Attendance Shows Little Change, supra note 136, at 11.
155. The Growth of College Football, supra note 108, at 3; Football Rights Hit $570 Million in
1986, BROADcASnNG, Aug. 4, 1986, at 56-58.
156. Football Rights in 1985 Hit $530 Million, supra note 145, at 33; Football Rights Hit $570
Million in 1986, supra note 155, at 56-58.
157. The Growth of College Football, supra note 108, at 3.
158. 1991 STAnTISCAL ABSTRAcr, supra note 102, at 556; Attendance Shows Little Change, supra
note 136, at 11.
159. 1993 STATS'TCAL ABSTRAcr, supra note 137, at 252.
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the market was working rather well. Only the final consumer seemed to be
benefiting.
V. Other Litigation
It was not long after the Supreme Court's decision in the NCAA case that others
got involved in litigating about the propriety of plans to televise college football.
A. UCLA v. Nebraska and USC v. Notre Dame
The University of Southern California, the University of California, the Pacific
Ten Conference, and the Big Ten Conference brought an action against ABC, the
College Football Association, the University of Nebraska, and Notre Dame alleging
that the agreement entered into by the College Football Association members
covering the televising of their games, particularly with reference to "cross-over""6
games, violated the antitrust laws and constituted a group boycott as well as price
fixing. 6" The plaintiffs sought a mandatory injunction to require the defendants to
consent to the televising of the Nebraska-UCLA game and the Notre Dame-USC
game."
The trial court granted a preliminary injunction restraining ABC and the CFA
from interfering with the televising of these games and the defendants appealed. 63
The circuit court affirmed. The Ninth Circuit majority determined that the
plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of success on the merits in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in NCAA. The circuit court majority noted that the CFA and
ABC had none of the accoutrements relating to the staging of the college football
game that was possessed by the NCAA. The court suggested that the ABC-CFA
contract appeared to constitute "classic horizontal restraints unadorned by any
organic relationship to the 'character and quality of the product.""67 The opinion
also indicated that the features of the ABC-CFA contract had output limitation
effects.'
While paying lip service to Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, the court found no
distinction between the NCAA plan condemned by the U.S. Supreme Court and the
ABC-CFA plan. The court affirmned the issuance of the preliminary injunction, and
the games proceeded and were televised according to the plaintiffs' desires. 7
160. A cross-over game is one in which a member of the CFA is playing a team not affiliated with
the CFA television plan. Nebraska and Notre Dame were subscribers to the plan and UCLA and USC
were not.




165. Id. at 516.
166. Id. at 517.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
170. American Broadcasting, 747 F.2d at 522.
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The dissent noted that there were significant procompetitive aspects to the ABC-
CFA plan.' Judge Beezer likened the ABC-CFA restrictions to the vertically
imposed territorial restrictions considered by the Supreme Court in Continental TV,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc." and commended them as procompetitive and not in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act." The dissent also discussed similarities
between the CFA-ABC pact and Broadcast Music. Interestingly, neither side
made a particular mention of the fact that the CFA pact was not exclusive in the
same sense as had been the NCAA arrangement. In the CFA arrangement, a team
could join the CFA or not, participate in the CFA television pact or not, and even
if a participant, still could sell its rights to televise its college football games in time
spots other than those occupied by the CFA contract without fear of sanction or
retribution. This mcst significant distinction between the CFA pact and the NCAA
arrangement was apparently overlooked. The antitrust consequences of such a
distinction, however, are enormous.
B. AITS v. CFA
Litigation in this area was also initiated by the Association of Independent
Television Stations and Sports View Company in two actions filed in the Western
District of Oklahoma against the College Football Association, the Big Eight
Conference, American Broadcasting Company, ABC Sports and Entertainment, and
Sports Programming Network, Inc." These two cases were consolidated, and,
once again, the Honorable Juan Burciaga was assigned to preside. The basic thrust
of the complaints of the plaintiffs in these two consolidated cases was the same as
in University of California. In essence, the plaintiffs contended that the CFA pact
suffered from the same infirmities as the NCAA plan, and, therefore, the plaintiffs
were entitled to relief which constituted treble damages, injunctive relief, and
attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs contended that the CFA arrangement violated sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and constituted tortious interference with contractual
and business relations.
76
Judge Burciaga, in a forty-eight-page opinion, denied Plaintiffs' Motions for
Summary Judgment and discussed the CFA Plan in great detail. He compared it to
the NCAA plan. In essence, Judge Burciaga held that the CFA plan did not on its
face have the same impediments as the NCAA plan and summary judgment should
not be granted." The tenor of his lengthy opinion and the critical analysis he
171. Id. at 526 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
172. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
173. American Broadcasting, 747 F.2d at 526 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
174. Id.
175. Those two actions are: (1) Association of Indep. Television Stations, Inc. v. College Football
Ass'n, CIV. No. 84-2283-JB (WV.D. Okla. filed 1984); and (2) Sports View Co. v. College Football Ass'n,
CIV. No. 84-2367-JB (W.D. Okla. filed Sept. 21, 1984).
176. Association of Indep. TV v. College Football Ass'n, 637 F. Supp. 1289, 1291 (W.D. Okla.
1986).
177. Id. at 1305-08.
[Vol. 48:669
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol48/iss4/3
NCAA & PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST
carried out so discouraged the plaintiffs of ever having any success in pursuing their
claims that the cases were abandoned after this decision.
It is not an overstatement to suggest that Judge Burciaga approved the CFA plan
and, in essence, said: "This is what I was referring to as being an appropriate plan
when I disapproved the NCAA plan." Basically, from 1986 until 1990, the CFA
television plan proceeded without successful interruption.
C. F.T.C. v. C.F.A.
In September 1990, the Federal Trade Commission brought a complaint against
the College Football Association and Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. alleging violation of
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.'78 The complaint alleged that the
College Football Association agreement violated section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act in that it restricted competition in the marketing of college football
telecasts. The complaint further charged that the competition among schools in the
marketing of college football telecasts had been impeded as had competition among
telecasters. Finally, the complaint alleged that consumers had been deprived of the
selection of college football games that would have otherwise been available in a
competitive environment. With the sounds of "saturation" still ringing in the
colleges' ears, here was the Federal Trade Commission contending that the CFA
pact was limiting output.
Although it took almost four years, the Federal Trade Commission finally
dismissed the complaint with prejudice as to the College Football Association.'
The complaint against Capital Cities/ABC was also dismissed without prejudice by
the Commission.8 ' In essence, the Commission found that it lacked jurisdiction
over the College Football Association.'' The Commission affirmed the ruling of
the administrative law judge in dismissing the complaint because the College
Football Association was a nonprofit organization and, as such, was exempt from
Federal Trade Commission regulation."
D. Law v. NCAA
A byproduct of the NCAA decision is the Law v. NCAA case. Here, the
Restricted Earnings Coach Rule was attacked by several coaches as being violative
of the antitrust laws in that it constituted price fixing."8 The NCAA had required
in all Division I sports other than football that each institution designate one of its
coaches as a restricted earnings coach. This coach could not earn more than
$16,000 during the year.' This rule was challenged as being violative of the
178. College Football Ass'n, No. 9242 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Sept. 5, 1990) (initiation).





183. 901 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Kan: 1995).
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Sherman Act, as interpreted by the NCAA. 6 The court found that a per se
approach was not appropriate in dealing with the NCAA's role in regulating college
athletics."
For now, at least, the antitrust challenges seem to be at an end. The framework
established by the College Football Association and mimicked by the conferences
seems to be judicially recognized as free from competitive disadvantage. If ever
tested under the rule of reason, it is relatively safe to predict that a television plan
similar to the College Football Association Plan with its lack of exclusivity will be
found to be more procompetitive than anticompetitive.
V1. Crrent Conference Packages and Realignment
Between 1980 and 1983, the number of television households grew by 9.2%; the
number of cable households grew by 86 .7 %.
' In the subsequent three-year period
from 1983 to 1986, the respective growth rates were 3.6% and 39.3%. ' On the
one hand, these statistics imply that any increase in the over-the-air broadcasters'
demand for the rights, to college television football subsequent to NCAA would be
minor when compared with the comparable pre-NCAA period. The effects of a
slowdown in the growth of the potential audience could only be exacerbated by the
elimination of exclusivity in the provision of the product. On the other hand, the
statistics also imply that the demand for those rights by cable systems would
continue to increase. Thus, by the time 1987 rolled around, with the exception of
the dedicated football fan, all of the various parties with an interest in the
telecasting of collegiate football were taking a second look at what NCAA and the
greater accessibility of cable systems had wrought.
Thanks to: (1) CFA contracts with ABC and ESPN; (2) the Big Ten-Pacific Ten
contract with CBS (up to twenty-nine appearances) and the network's supplementary
contract with the ACC (up to seven appearances), the University of Miami contract
(for one or two games), and Army-Navy contract for their game; (3) WTBS
contracts to televise eleven early afternoon SEC and Big Ten games in the
Southeast and Midwest, respectively, and its supplementary contract with the Big
Ten, the Pacific Ten, and the ACC for another dozen or so prime-time games; and
(4) syndicators such as: (i) Raycom, which had packages of eleven games each for
the Big Eight and the SWC to be televised in their respective regions of interest, (ii)
TEN, which had a twelve-game package of Boston College, Pittsburgh, and
Syracuse games to distribute to the Northeast, (iii) Summit Sports, which packaged
eleven military academy games, (iv) Jefferson Pilot, with a package of at least
186. Id. at 1398.
187. Id. at 1404. After employing a rule of reason analysis, the court determined that the restricted
earnings coach rule to be violative of the Sherman Act by prohibiting the free operation of a market
responsive to demand. I& at 1405. The court determined that the NCAA had not met its burden to
establish the pro competirive aspect of this rule, and therefore, granted plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment on the issue of liability. Id. at 1410.
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eleven ACC games, and (v) the USA Network, which would pick up selected games
from the Raycom, TEN, and Jefferson Pilot packages, on a typical fall Saturday
afternoon, a dedicated college football fan living in the eastern time zone could start
watching the games over lunch and continue to do so, with minimal breaks, through
and well beyond dinner. Only the range of starting and ending times might have
differed for fans in the Western Time Zone. Even Public Broadcasting got into the
act with a package of Ivy League games. Further, pay-per-view television had
become an increasingly feasible option for making individual games available in
particular communities, especially in college towns.
If, however, the broadcasters and the schools were starting to show somewhat less
enthusiasm for the disappearance of the controls on college football telecasts, there
were good reasons. The broadcasters discovered, as they must all along have
anticipated, that due to: (1) the fractionating of audiences among games that no
longer had time-slot exclusivity; (2) the fact that even dedicated fans were selective
in choosing among the various options offered to them; and (3) the fact that, thanks
to the "remote," a fan could easily switch from one televised game to another during
a timeout and a commercial, games were less saleable to sponsors. As a result,
broadcasters were losing money on their college football agreements."
The schools involved in conference packages discovered that by offering their
games in more than one package, not only did they risk overexposure and its
deleterious effects on the value of their broadcast rights, they also risked alienating
season-ticket holders who did not appreciate last-minute changes in starting times
at a telecaster's whim, nor did they appreciate being forced to sit through lengthy
and unnecessary timeouts imposed on them by television sponsors. Under these
circumstances, athletic directors suspected season-ticket holders were beginning to
have second thoughts about making a commitment to pay $15-$20 to see a game
that, if it turned out to be an "important" game, would in all likelihood be available
for viewing, free of charge, in the friendly confines of one's own home.
In this setting, even before the 1986 season got under way, the CFA signed a pair
of right-of-first-refusal four-year agreements, to begin in 1987, with CBS, which
replaced ABC as the CFA's over-the-air outlet, and ESPN, which continued as its
cable outlet. 9' The agreements were worth about $130 million for the four years,
or an average of $32.5 million a year. All sixty-three CFA members agreed to
participate in the agreements. This meant that each school would receive an
estimated $125,000 annually from the participation pool. The remaining $24.6
million would leave an average of $390,000 for television appearances, averaged
over the sixty-three schools. Thus, the contract would provide an overall annual
average of about $515,000 per team. This figure would rise slightly if any member
school was on NCAA probation for a serious violation, one that the NCAA had
determined merited a television sanction that banned the school from appearing in
a televised game." Even neglecting the effects of inflation on the value of the
190. Football Rights Hold Line at $570 Million, BROADCASTING, Aug. 3, 1987, at 40.
191. CFA Review of ESPN and CBS Agreement, SIDELINES, Sept. 1987, at 10.
192. In a subsequent ruling in October 1984, Judge Burciaga in effect gave the NCAA carte blanche
19951
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1995
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
dollar, network television revenues once again failed to grow. Indeed, the CFA now
guaranteed its members that these revenues would not grow, at least not through the
CFA, for at least anocther five years.
In order to simply maintain the participants' average payoff, the CFA had to
expand the number of exposures. In 1987, CBS was to televise an average of fifteen
to seventeen mid-afternoon (eastern time) games on sixteen dates and one prime-
time game each season."93 ESPN was to televise twelve late-afternoon games that
would overlap the CBS games, as well as fifteen prime-time games each season.'"
Time-slot exclusivity, even within the CFA package, was starting to erode. CBS
essentially picked up ABC's tab and would be paying $15 million a year, a modest
$2 million increase. 5 ESPN increased its total commitment to $69.5 million, with
planned increases of about $1 million a year from the initial 1987 payment of
$15.75 million, a $3.75 million increase over 1986." ESPN was also scheduled
to televise an additional eleven games late Saturday evenings and on Thursday
evenings in packages with less prominent football-playing schools.
After bidding on and failing to get the CFA contract, ABC picked up the Big
Ten-Pacific Ten contract that formerly belonged to CBS.' ABC and the confer-
ences agreed to a four-year deal that would initially pay them $12 million for their
rights, which was exactly what CBS had paid in 1986 for right-of-first-refusal
packages that included the ACC."8 The 1987 rates for a thirty-second spot on
ABC or CBS were in the neighborhood of $38,000, continuing their downhill slide
from the 1982-83 figure of $60,000.I" The effects of competing telecasts and the
proliferation of games in general continued to take its toll.
Although WTBS continued with its ten- to twelve-game SEC package, it had lost
an acknowledged "millions of dollars" on its three 1986 packages.'n Because of
these losses, WTBS abandoned its other two packages, both of which involved the
to apply television sanctions to schools that it found guilty of having committed non-television-related
violations. Four schools that had been so sanctioned by the NCAA in 1984, Arizona, Kansas, Clemson,
and Mississippi, chose to observe the bans placed on them in the 1984 season, prior to the judge's ruling,
and thus became eligible to participate in 1985 television packages; Southern California, Wisconsin, and
Illinois chose not to observe the NCAA prohibitions placed on them, as a result of which they became
ineligible to participate in the 1985 Pacific Ten and Big Ten packages. The University of Florida was
banned from participating in the CFA's 1985 package. 4 Teams Face Ban From TV During 1985,
SIDELINES, Dec. 1984, at 3.
193. CFA Review o'ESPN and CBS Agreement, supra note 191, at 10.
194. Id.
195. Football Right; Hold Line at $570 Million, supra note 190, at 39-40.
196. Id.
197. lad
198. Id. at 39. In the spring of 1989, these contracts, which included rights to the Rose Bowl, were
extended through the 1996-97 season. Broadcast, Cable Battle for the Ball, BROADCASTING, Aug. 14,
1989, at 40. To put regular-season rights and Bowl-game rights into perspective, "in the second year of
a nine-year deal with the Pac Ten and Big Ten conferences, ABC will pay $13 million for a package of
23 to 24 regular season games and approximately $10 million for rights to the Rose Bowl." Id.
199. Football Rights Hold Line at $570 Million, supra note 190, at 40; Radio-TV's Football Tab:
$493.7 Million, supra ncte 98, at 38.
200. Football Rights Hold Line at $570 Million, supra note 190, at 40.
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Big Ten. The USA network also decided to drop college football from its
schedule."' The Pacific Ten, the Big Eight, and Penn State decided against
syndicating games. PBS viewers, however, could once again enjoy Ivy League
football, Raycom continued to package SWC games, Jefferson Pilot continued to
package ACC games, and with RCM Inc. packaging Big Ten games, it was
estimated that the average Big Ten school would increase its television take from
$900,000 to $1.1 million.an
In 1987, about ninety games, one out of every seven played, were telecast
nationally on ABC, CBS, ESPN, and WTBS alone;' additional games were
televised in different parts of the country through syndication. Football fans did not
exactly stay away from the stadia in droves: attendance at the college football
games increased by 70,000 (.2%).20 Attendance at Division I-A games did
decrease by 1.2%; but ten fewer games were played in 1987 than in 1986, and the
average attendance per game actually increased by .4%.'° Under the onslaught of
competition from a wide variety of televised "big time" football alternatives,
attendance at non-Division I-A games, which the NCAA had argued was a
particular source of concern that it was seeking to protect through its controls,
increased by 3.7%.'
Moreover, and although the supporting data are unavailable, we harbor the strong
suspicion that average ticket prices were on a monotonic long-term upward trend
that continues to this day. The elimination of the NCAA's television controls may
well have adversely affected its members' total television receipts, the average
receipts of schools whose teams would ordinarily not be ranked in the Top 25, and
the network profits realized from televising college football. But for the fans the
results would seem to have been completely on the plus side of the ledger.
Because of the four-year network contracts, the only differences between 1987
and the 1988-90 years arose from changes in the schools' and syndicators' views
towards syndicating packages of games and, most particularly, the appearance of
SportsChannel (SCA, backed by NBC and Cablevision) and Prime Sports Network
(PSN), with which it merged under the Liberty Sports umbrella towards the end of
1993. These so-called "premium" cable outlets sought college football packages,
often combining with other broadcasters and/or syndicators in the packaging process
in order to make such packages economically viable. In 1988, for example, SCA
(New York) carried eight games of a Jefferson Pilot Eastern Independents
syndicated package and four games from Raycom's SWC package. 7 On the West
Coast, PSN offered a package of Los Angeles football powers' games (Southern
201. Id.
202. Id. at 42.
203. Id. at 39-42.
204. 1991 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 102, at 556.
205. Attendance Shows Little Change, supra note 136, at 11.
206. Subtracting Division IA attendance figures, Attendance Shows Little Change, supra note 136,
at 11, from total attendance, 1993 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT. supra note 137, at 252, yields non-Division
IA attendance figures of 10,596,000 and 10,991,000 for 1986 and 1987, respectively.
207. Football Rights Pass $600 Million, BROADCASTING, Aug. 15, 1988, at 44.
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California and UCLA), along with games of the University of Hawaii, San Diego
State, and the Big West Conference. Florida's Sunshine Network carried the
Jefferson Pilot packages of Eastern Independents and the ACC and many other
games, including twelve from Raycom's Big Ten package. Both Home Team Sports
(HTS) and Madison Square Garden (MSG) also carried Raycom's Big Ten package.
By 1989, competition for the secondary rights to the games reached the point that
the Prime-ESPN venture signed a six-year, $66-million contract with the Pacific
Ten."' With this contract in its stable, in 1990, PSN could offer thirty-three live
telecasts of Pacific Ten, SWC, and Big Eight games, in particular. MSG offered
thirteen live telecasts of Pacific Ten and SWC games. SCA was offering its viewers
principally regional favorites, featuring Notre Dame nationally, as well as Florida,
Miami, Syracuse, the Big Ten, and the Big West." With it all, in news that was
by now old hat, attendance remained stable, averaging 36.2 million for the 1988-90
period, despite a 2.4% dip in 1988 and again increasing to 36.6 million in 1991. "
Athletic Directors would not seem to have taken too seriously their previously
professed concerns about the impact of television on attendance and gate receipts.
Between 1983 and 1993, total capacity at the stadia of 108 Division I-A schools
increased by 264,000 or 4.9%.211
Over and above what was taking place in regards to syndication and the
development of premium-channel sports networks, 1990 was a watershed year for
college football television for two not-unrelated reasons. First, perennial football
power and CFA member Notre Dame, the largest television draw and the one school
with a national following, signed a five-year, $30 million agreement with NBC that
gave this heretofore college football-starved network exclusive rights to its home
games." 2 Second, in June, it was agreed that the powerful Eastern independent,
Penn State, would join the Big Ten, and a month later a long-time SWC member,
the University of Arkansas, agreed to join the SEC, where it .would soon be able to
welcome a Southern independent, the University of South Carolina, as the SEC's
twelfth and newest member."3 The latter couplings provide an unmistakable
portent for the future: conference loyalties and/or tradition taking a back seat to the
attraction of the television dollar, as conference television cartels form and
conferences accordingly realign. The express purpose of these cartels is to offer
broadcasters a supply of attractive sports television packages, primarily in basketball
and football, that at a minimum can be regionally syndicated to a large number of
television households that constitute a cartel's constituency. The former development
offered an unmistakable signal that some schools and some conferences, besides
Notre Dame, the Big Ten, and the Pacific Ten, might in the future compete on their
own as sellers in the college football television market.
208. Broadcast, Cabl, Battle for the Ball, supra note 198, at 41.
209. Id. at 42.
210. 1993 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 137, at 252.
211. Susan Hiller, Increasing Capacity, A Look at Division I-A Football Stadiums, SIDELINEs, Mar.
1994, at 8.
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Notre Dame's deal was announced shortly after the CFA negotiated a 50%
increase in its payments from ESPN and ABC, which replaced CBS as the CFA's
over-the-air partner in entering into a five-year agreement valued at $570 million
per season."1 4 This was the first really substantive increase in rights revenues
secured by the CFA. To put this increase in perspective, however, the National
Football League's new network contracts that became effective in 1990 raised the
league's annual rights revenues by 73%.2"' And from 1987 to 1990, the number
of television homes increased by 5.8%, with the number of cable households
increasing by 23.8%."6 To put the duo of contracts in further perspective from
a somewhat different angle, ESPN was 80% owned by ABC's parent corporation,
Capital Cities/ABC" 7 Capital Cities was, therefore, acquiring the exclusive
rights to CFA football. And to put these contracts in yet further perspective, as
noted above, ABC had already locked up the Big Ten-Pacific Ten schools in an
agreement that would pay them an average of $17 million a year through 1996.
Capital Cities and ABC, therefore, had managed to once again acquire the
exclusive over-the-air national network rights to all major college football.
Furthermore, Capital Cities managed to accomplish the latter for a total payment
of a little less than $60 million - or almost exactly what CBS and ABC had
agreed would be the "minimum aggregate fee" in the 1982 agreements with the
NCAA!18 Assuredly, the approximately $20 million that ESPN would pay the
CFA, Big Ten, and Pacific Ten teams was a little more than twice what the
NCAA's 1982-83 contract with WTBS was worth annually. But that contract only
called for nineteen exposures a year, spread over 150 schools; ESPN, by contrast,
would be televising forty-eight games to be chosen from an eighty-team football
elite, with the potential to reach 53% more households than did cable in 1983.29
Thus, the sale of broadcast rights was doubtless becoming more profitable to the
schools than it had been, but whether it was more profitable to the majority of
football-playing schools than it once had been, including the majority of the
eighty-three, is not self-evident from the aggregate data.
An additional sobering consideration is that once the Notre Dame agreement
became a reality, the CFA had to accept a $50 million reduction for a five-year
package that would no longer include the Fighting Irish.' As a result, in 1991,
the remaining sixty-two CFA participants would divide $60 million between them,
giving the members an average payment of about $1 million, with every member
guaranteed at least $225,000.' Layered on top of all of this were the revenues
214. CFA, ABC & ESPN Set For 1991 Season, SIDELINES, Mar. 1990, at 3.
215. Football '90: More Players Carry $1 Billion Ball, supra note 212, at 34.
216. 1991 STATISTICAL ABSTRACt, supra note 102, at 556.
217. Richard Sandomis, FTC Loses a Round on Televised Football, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1991, at
B9.
218. See supra tbl. 1.
219. 1991 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 102, at 556; 1986 STATISTICAL ABSTRACr, supra
note 141, at 229.
220. College Football and Television, SIDELINES, Sept. 1993, at 4.
221. Id.
1995]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1995
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
generated through the sale of syndication rights, primarily through conference
packages. Thus, a school such as the SEC's University of Mississippi, which in
1983 earned $743,000 in rights revenues, earned about $1.9 million for those rights
in 1994, a 156% increase.'m Ole Miss historically fields good football teams that
threaten to appear in the Top 25, but that rarely make good on the threat. Its
experience would, therefore, seem to offer a reasonable exemplar of the average
school in a football-criented conference.
In 1988-89, Notre Dame received $1.53 million from the CFA contracts.
2
2
Under the NBC contract, Notre Dame and its opponents would divide $1.2 million
a game for each of five home games. Notre Dame was thus guaranteed $3 million
a year for the broadcast rights to its home football telecasts alone. Given a schedule
that usually includes visits to one or more of Michigan, Michigan State, and Purdue
of the Big Ten, Southern California of the Pacific Ten, and a University of Miami,
Tennessee, or Florida State, in 1990, the prospects of Notre Dame's earning perhaps
as much as an additional $1 million through cross-over telecasts must have appeared
eminently bright. In 1.992, however, the ratings for NBC's telecasts of Notre Dame
games were described as "unusually weak," with the result that the network aspired
to selling its 1993 thirty-second spots for $50,000.' In 1992, ABC sold its spots
for about $65,000, which was just about what it charged in 1983.'
Even in 1990, it seemed doubtful that any school other than Notre Dame could
successfully sustain a one-school package of its games. In 1995, as the football
team's fortunes continue to slide, carrying with them the television ratings of its
games, it seems doubtful that even Notre Dame can continue to sustain a one-school
package of its games. The more relevant issue is what the realigned and resultingly
stronger conferences will be able to achieve by way of rights revenues for their
members, especially since the number of television homes was virtually unchanged
from 1990 to 1993, the most recent year for which data are available, while the
number of cable television homes has increased by less than 9% during this
time.'
The SEC has now expanded to twelve teams that segment into two divisions.
This structure is used to justify an end-of-the-season football playoff game between
the two division leaders, a game that has national appeal and, as a consequence, is
a valuable television property. Eleven schools now comprise the Big Ten, and the
ACC has added football power Florida State in becoming a nine-team league. The
Big East, which contained a mix of some traditional football powers such as
Syracuse and Pittsburgh and some traditional basketball powers such as Seton Hall
222. William Taaffe, The Supreme Court's TV Ruling: Will the Viewers Benefit Most?, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, July 9, 1984, at 147; Associated Press, NCAA Hits Ole Miss with Stiff Penalties,
GAINESVILLE SUN, Nov. 18, 1994, at IC.
223. Richard Sandomis, Notre Dame Scores a $38 Million Touchdown on Its TV Deal, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 1991, § 8, at 9.
224. Christopher Stem, TV-Radio Rights in '93: The Billion Dollar Ticket, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Aug. 16, 1993, at 27.
225. Id.; Radio-TV's Football Tab: $493.7 Million, supra note 98, at 38.
226. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 567 (1994).
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and Georgetown, added the University of Miami. For the past two decades, the
Hurricanes have consistently been one of the best football teams in the nation. The
SWC will soon be history, becoming the first major conference to fall victim to the
emergence of new television cartels. The defection of Arkansas was merely a
precursor to the defections of the University of Texas (Austin), Baylor, Texas
A&M, and Texas Tech to the Big Eight, which in 1996 becomes the Big Twelve.
The Big Twelve members have adopted a two-division structure leading to a
saleable-to-television end-of-the-season playoff. Of the other current SWC members,
Rice, Texas Christian, and Southern Methodist will join the WAC, and the
University of Houston is poised to align with such geographically proximate schools
as Tulane and Memphis State.
At the end of 1995, the Big Ten and the Pacific Ten pacts with ABC and ESPN
expired. The CFA's pact with ABC and ESPN also expired at the end of the 1995
season. The SEC has already announced that it will sell its games to CBS rather
than participate in any new CFA pact.' In 1986, ABC will televise select Big 12
and Pacific 10 games (as will the cable network FX) and will also televise certain
Big 10, ACC, and WAC games.' ESPN (now owned by Disney) will televise
sixty-two games from a variety of conferences, while ESPN2 will carry sixteen
Division I games. 9 The eight football schools of the Big East have contracted
with CBS for their games. For the purpose of acting as a supplier in the college
football television market, the CFA has thus been bereft of its football-playing elite,
that elite having done to the CFA precisely what the CFA had attempted to do to
the NCAA over a decade earlier. As a result, the CFA announced that it will not
have a television plan after 1995."
Also, left out in the cold until recently, when ABC picked up the rights to its
games, was the WAC, one of whose members, San Diego State, has been earning
approximately $1.5 million as its share of the CFA contract. The WAC is not a
premiere football conference, and San Diego State is scarcely a perennial, or even
an occasional, football power. One may infer from this that the Alabamas,
Michigans, Miamis, and Nebraskas of this football-playing world will be guaranteed
rights payments in considerable excess of $1.5 million from their future conference
packages, with pay-per-view revenues from individual games providing the icing on
the cake.
In the latter regard, since 1992, ABC has been offering games that it is televising
over the air in one region, on a pay-per-view basis in other regions. ABC projected
that 20,000 to 40,000 of the 20 million outlets that can exercise a pay-per-view
option will do so for these games, which initially carried a "suggested retail price"
of $8.95 per game." The cable operators retain about 45% of the price on any
sale, with the remainder being divided between the distributor, the network, and the
227. Debra Blum, The Big Scramble, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 16, 1994, at 1.
228. Where the Sports Are, BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 13, 1996, at 41-44.
229. Id.
230. FTC Dismisses Case Against CFA and Capital Cities/ABC, SIDELINES, Sept. 1994, at 3.
231. ABC To Offer Pay Per-View, SIDELINES, July/Aug. 1992, at 12.
1995]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1995
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
television cartels with which it has agreements. This particular source of rights
revenues can only grow in the future, a future that apparently will not include the
CFA, the competitive market and the theory of cartels having claimed yet another
victim.
VII. Conclusion
In reflecting upon the NCAA decision a decade after the fact, Donnie Duncan,
former Athletic Director at the University of Oklahoma, and presently the associate
commissioner in charge of football of the Big 12, views the decision as having had
both positive and negative consequences."
On the plus side of the ledger, Duncan suggests that the public has benefitted in
that there is more televised college football and, therefore, greater viewer choice.
The authors suggest that the latter result from the fact that the number and games
to be telecast are determined through free-market forces, rather than through the
backroom decisions of an illegal cartel.
On the minus side of the ledger, Duncan points to the changed conference
structures that have not necessarily been in the best interests of even the casual
college football fan. The health of any conference depends upon healthy rivalries,
which really means ongoing and traditional rivalries: Michigan-Ohio State, Texas-
Texas A&M, Oklahoma-Nebraska, Florida-Georgia, Duke-North Carolina, Southern
Cal-UCLA, and, yes, even Harvard-Yale. While it is too soon to make a final
determination, it is not at all unlikely that these conference realignments may have
fostered unnatural alliances that while seeming to make economic sense in the short
term, will not evolve into the healthy rivalries that make a conference viable in the
long term. Duncan has the further concern that consolidation of historically
powerful football schools into the same conference cuts down the number of
powerhouses that can reign as conference champions and therefore limits the
number available to qualify for automatic bids to the leading postseason Bowl
games, which are always financial blockbusters. In the SEC, for example, for the
past few years highly regarded Alabama and Florida have eliminated one another
from an automatic Sugar Bowl bid in the SEC conference championship game, and
in 1994, newcomer Penn State ran roughshod over the Big Ten's erstwhile
pretenders to the Rose Bowl. For its part, Florida State has lost only one ACC
football game during its three-year membership, relegating its conference brethren,
like those of Penn State, to also-ran status and, at best, second-class bowls.
Like other observers, Duncan is unsure of what the future holds for college
football, live and over the air, but, on balance, he remains confident that the health
of the game today is good. There remains considerable enthusiasm for the sport
nationwide, and its growth has been continuing.
232. Id.
233. Interview with Donnie Duncan, Director of Athletics, University of Oklahoma, in Norman,
Okla. (Mar. 30, 1995).
[Vol. 48:669
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol48/iss4/3
NCAA & PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST
One may correctly surmise from our analysis that Justice White's two predictions
in his NCAA dissent were incorrect. First, his belief that college football would be
threatened by unbridled competition was a serious misapprehension.' A decade's
worth of experience reveals that college football is even better off than when he
made that prediction.
Justice White's second prediction, notably, that a successor CFA plan or other
similar plans would suffer the same fate as the NCAA plan, has also proved to be
far off the mark. 5 Repeated challenges to Broadcast Music-type plans have been
unsuccessful. The major college football-playing schools have learned how to
compete with each other in the packaging and marketing of the broadcast rights to
their games in the context of a free-market economy. Moreover, they have done so
without violating the antitrust laws, which is something the NCAA could never
seem to learn.
As a result of NCAA, a market affecting millions of football fans and thousands
of athletes, and one that generates enormous sums of money, is now competitive
instead of subject to cartel control. Private enforcement of the antitrust laws has
succeeded for the fan-consumer and for student-athletes who now get greater
television exposure than they would have dreamed imaginable prior to NCAA.
Assuredly, the financial fate of the market participants cannot be accurately
predicted. A market that is subject to illegal horizontal restraints is much more
predictable than one that is free. Our laws will not tolerate the former and demand
the latter. Is this hully-gully? Hardly. This is the free market in operation. Sic
bicuitus disintegrat.
234. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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